



AFRICOM: Opportunities and Challenges

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

Agenda

**THIS WILL NOT BE A
POWERPOINT-A-THON**




AFRICOM

BEFORE



AFTER





Phases of a Military Campaign

1. Deter/engage
2. Seize the initiative
3. Decisive operations
4. Transition/stability operations



Phases of a Military Campaign

0. Prevention
1. Deter/engage
2. Seize the initiative
3. Decisive operations
4. Transition/stability operations



Human Security Approach

- Greatest security threat to Liberia not from neighbors
- Greatest security threat to Liberia from potential internal grievances:
 - Lack of social justice
 - Political exclusion for groups
 - Economic hardship/ disproportionate distribution of wealth
 - Lack of public security
 - Failure of tenants of democracy
 - Discontented segments of society
- Domestic armed groups exploit grievances for support and sanctuary
- Thus, the best weapon against intrastate threats is development

The best weapons against intrastate conflict do not fire bullets.



Human Security Approach

- Human Security Model emphasizes security via development
- Traditional “National” Security Model best for interstate conflict
- “Human” Security Model best for intrastate conflict

Traditional “National” Security Model



“Human” Security Model



Stability and development are inextricably linked and mutually reinforcing.



SSR Lessons Learned

International Actors

- Security is the first priority
- Humanitarian relief is the second
- Inclusion of all warring parties
- Political agreement
- Comprehensive and synchronized approach
- Sufficient funds and political will
- Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR)
- Political mandate



SSR Lessons Learned

Host Nation Level

- Political will
- Institute oversight bodies early
- National Security Strategy that addresses root causes of conflict
- Public sensitization
- All institutions must rise together
- Civilian leadership
- Maximum practicable transparency



SSR Lessons Learned

Operational Implementers

- It may be necessary to start over
- Vigorously vet all candidates
- Inculcate respect for the rule of law, human rights norms and international humanitarian law into all levels of training
- Foster allegiance to the constitution rather than an individual leader
- Force structure must reflect the country's needs
- Defense-oriented force posture with limited force-projection capability
- Force size constrained by government's ability to pay salaries
- Limited artillery, armor, intelligence, fighter aircraft and special operations
- Smaller, well-trained, volunteer force preferable
- Create a professional culture based on merit
- Eschew ill-fitting doctrinal templates
- Balanced ethnic mix in the ranks
- Literacy is important



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Comments

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